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OF ONE-LEGGED MARATHONERS AND
LEGALLY BLIND PILOTS: DISABLING THE ADA
ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS
Vicki J. Limas*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ADA's DIMINISHED PROTECTION
Using a contrived approach to statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court this
term embraced the "disturbing trend" in the lower courts of "nariowing... the
definition of disability"' under the Americans with Disabilities Ace ("ADA" or "the
Act"), thus "depriv[ing] qualified individuals of the opportunity to prove...
discriminat[ion] under the ADA."3 In a cramped reading of the ADA that ignored
relevant statutory language, explicit direction from Congress and the Court's own
precedent, the Court severely limited the class of "individual[s] with a disability"4
subject to the ADA's protections. A number of the ADA's drafters expressed
disbelief and dismay at the Court's interpretation of this phrase to exclude those
*. Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. This paper is based
on remarks delivered at the Conference, 1998-99 Supreme Court Update, at The University of Tulsa on December
8, 1999. I thank Barbara F. Geffen, General Counsel and Secretary of the Board of Trustees of The University of
Tulsa, for participating in this program with me and discussing the Court's rulings from the perspective of one who
must implement them in a diverse institution.
1. Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the "Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional
Intent, 42 ViLL. L REV. 587, 587 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. Mayerson, supra note I, at 487. For additional criticisms of courts' restrictive readings of "disability," see
generally Robert L. BurgdorfJr., "Substantially Limited"Protectionfrom Disability Discrimination: The Special
Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 V\iu.. L. REV. 409 (1997) [hereinafter
referred to as "Substantially Limited" Protection]; Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se
Prejudice: How Individualizing the Determination of "Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327
(1997); Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of Disability under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L REV. 107 (1996).
4. All the various titles of the ADA contain the phrase "individual with a disability," and its three-pronged
definition appears in a general section governing all titles under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994). One may
be an "individual with a disability" if he or she has 1) an actual disability; 2) a history or record of a disability; or
3) is regarded as having a disability. ld. See text accompanying notes 48-59, infra., for a discussion of the ADA's
three-part definition of disability. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment, id. at §§ 12111-
12117; Title 11 prohibits discrimination in public services, id. at §§ 12131-12150; Title M prohibits discrimination
in public accommodations and services operated by private entities, id. at §§ 12181-12189; Title IV amends the
Federal Trade and Communications Act to require telecommunications services for the hearing and visually
impaired, 42 U.S.C. § 12190 (1994); and Title V contains miscellaneous provisions, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213
(1994). This article will confine its discussion to the first prong of the ADA's disability definition.
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whose mental or physical impairments are corrected or controlled by medication or
devices such as hearing aids.5
Last term the Court had generated optimism among advocates for the disabled
when, in Bragdon v. Abbott,6 its first opportunity to interpret the ADA, it broadly
construed "individual with a disability" to include persons infected with the humanimmunodeficiency virus ("HIV") but experiencing no serious symptoms of the
infection. That optimism dissolved this term in a trilogy of cases arising under Title
I of the ADA covering disability discrimination in employment': Sutton v. United
Airlines,8 Albertsons v. Kirkingburg,9 and Murphy v. United Parcel Service.0
These cases reflect the basic holding, set out in Sutton, that "disability" is to be
determined taking into account corrective measures " to ameliorate an impairment 2
Unlike Bragdon, these cases can affect a great number of employees in workplaces
covered by Title I'" by excluding those employees altogether from Title I's
protections.
The Court's analysis in Bragdon acknowledged legislative history and
followed Congress' statutory direction by deferring to agencies' interpretations of
the ADA and its predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("the Rehabilitation
Act").' 4 However, the Court refused to analyze this term's cases similarly. Instead,
it interpreted the Act based on what it deemed a "plain language" reading of the
ADA as a whole, central to which was just one of the Act's prefatory findings: A
1988 estimate of the number of people who are disabled.'5
The irony of the Court's conclusion is that, although ADA plaintiffs must now
prove aprimafacie case of disability on the basis of their corrected impairments,
the employers in each of the subject cases had denied the plaintiffsjobs on the basis
of their uncorrected impairments. These plaintiffs might arguably have been
5. Professor Chai Feldblum, in remarks heard by this author at the Plenary Session of the Annual Meeting of
the Association of American Law Schools in Washington, D.C., on January 7, 2000, identified herself as one of
the ADA's authors and told the group assembled that none of the Act's authors intended that disability
determinations be made based on an individual's medicated state. SeeAALS CentennialAnnual Meeting Plenary
Session--A Recommitment to Diversity, AALS NEVSLETTER 15 (February 2000), for a listing of panel members.
See also Susan J. McGolrick, Supreme Court's ThreeADA Decisions DisappointDisability RightsAdvocates, 132
DAiLY LABOR REPORT (BNA) C-1 (July 12, 1999).
6. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
8. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
9. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
10. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
11. The adjectives "ameliorative," "corrective, "controlling"" and "mitigating" will be used interchangeably to
denote the effect on mental or physical impairments of medication, prostheses, devices such as hearing aids, and
even the body's own compensation.
12. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,488 (1999).
13. Because the Court interpreted a definitional term of the ADA governing all its titles, the holdings are not
limited to Title L However, these cases all arose under Title I, and their holdings will have the greatest impact in
the employment setting.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-795(1) (1994).
15. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484-488 (1999).
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excluded from Title rs coverage in any event as being unqualified for these jobs, 6
but the Court obviated that determination. As will be discussed below, a determina-
tion of whether an employee is entitled to the protections of Title I involves a two-
step inquiry: first, whether that person is "an individual with a disability" and then
whether that person is "a qualified individual with a disability"--i.e., whether the
person is able to perform the essential functions of the job in question with or
without a reasonable accommodation by the employer." The Court, seemingly
influenced by the cases' facts, conflated the analysis of the first step into that of the
second. It is therefore unfortunate that these particular cases tested the issue of
whether the Act protects those whose impairments are controlled; many individuals
with mental or physical impairments would not be able to work at all but for the
medications they take or devices they use to control their impairments. Yet these
individuals may now lack protection under Title I from job actions taken against
them because of their impairments."
16. In Sutton, the plaintiffs, because of their visual impairments (severe myopia), did not meet the employer's
stated qualifications for the job of commercial airline pilot. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 476 (1999). InAlbertsons and
Murphy, the plaintiffs were not qualified because their impairments, monocular vision and high blood pressure,
respectively, prevented them from holding commercial truck driver positions according to Department of
Transportation regulations governing those positions. Albertsons, 527 U.S. at 560 (1999); Murphy, 527 U.S. at
520 (1999). The EEOC's regulations list compliance with conflicting federal laws or regulations as a possible
defense to an ADA claim under Title h
It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this part that a challenged action is required or
necessitated by another Federal law or regulation....
29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(e) (1999).
With regard to insulin-dependent diabetics, however, the Department of Transportation has been required
by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, P.L. No. 105-178 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 16, 23, 40 and 49 U.S.C.) (6110/98), to reevaluate its regulations that prohibit such persons from operating
commercial vehicles that exceed a certain size or carry more than 16 passengers. Nancy Montwieler, Arizona,
North Carolina Agree to Hire Diabetic Drivers; DOT is Examining Ban, 147 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1
(7131198).
The federal government has also targeted state regulations disqualifying persons with certain health
conditions. The Department of Justice settled ADA cases against Arizona and North Carolina, which agreed to
rescind regulations prohibiting insulin-dependent diabetics from driving school buses and to implement new
regulations that call for independent evaluations. Id.
In Albertsons, however, all nine justices seemed to endorse employers' reliance on federal regulations that
disqualify individuals with certain mental or physical conditions from holding regulated jobs. Albertsons, 527 U.S.
555, 570 (1999).
17. See text accompanying notes 41-58, infra.
18. If one's impairment is held not to be substantially limiting under Sutton, such individual may still be
protected under the "regarded as disabled" prong of the ADA's three-part definition of "disability," but the Court's
analysis of the "regarded as disabled" prong of the definition in Sutton and Murphy provides little guidance.
However, those cases do provide a lesson for plaintiffs in that the Suttons seemed to have committed a strategical
error by claiming they were, or United regarded them as, substantially limited in the major life activity of working
rather than seeing. See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,490 (1999). Likewise, Murphy alleged he was substantially limited,
and alternatively, that UPS regarded him as substantially limited, in the major life activity of working. Murphy,
527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999). According to the EEOC's regulations, substantial limitation in working should be
claimed only if one cannot claim substantial limitation in any other major life activity. With respect to working,
the regulations define "substantially limited" as
significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class ofjobs or a broad range ofjobs in various
classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability
to perform a single, particularjob does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999). Without deciding the validity of this regulation, the Court relied on it to analyze
the Suttons' claim that they were regarded as disabled in the major life activity of working. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-
3
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In another ADA case decided this term, disabled plaintiffs fared somewhat
better. In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp.,t9 the Court resolved
disagreement among circuits to plaintiffs' advantage. It unanimously held that one
who has applied for total disability benefits under the Social Security Act" ("SSA")
is not "judicially estopped" from suing her employer under Title I of the ADA as a
"qualified individual with a disability" whom the employer must reasonably
accommodate." However, the holding from Sutton may diminish the effect of
Cleveland's rule, as the plaintiff must still prove she is an "individual with a
disability" in her ADA claim.
After briefly discussing Cleveland, the remainder of this article will turn to the
issue of taking ameliorative or corrective measures into account when determining
whether an individual is disabled under the ADA. The language of the ADA, the
EEOC regulations and guidance implementing it, and then the statute's legislative
history will be examined. The reasoning of Bragdon will be contrasted to that of
Sutton, Albertsons and Murphy, illustrating that the Court's "plain language"
analysis of this term's cases fell short of the interpretive requirements mandated by
the statute and byBragdon. The discussion will then return to language of the ADA
that actually does involve consideration of corrective measures and show that the
Court's conclusion that such measures must be taken into account in determining
disability is contrary to the statute's "plain language" regarding those corrective
measures. Finally, the article will discuss the problems and ambiguities created by
493 (1999). Because they did not allege they were denied employment in a broad range of pilotingjobs, but rather
that they were denied the specific job of global airline pilot, the Court held that they were not substantially limited
with regard to the major life activity of working. Id. at 493. Had the Suttons claimed United regarded them as
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, the above regulation would have not applied.
However, the Court erred in applying this regulation because it is inapplicable to the "regarded as" prong
of the disability definition. Under that prong the focus is on the prejudicial attitudes of the employer, not the
individual's impairment. It is intended to be used when the individual does not have an actual, substantially
limiting impairment but is regarded as having one by an employer. The EEOC regulations, taken from the
Department of Justice's regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, define "is regarded as having such an
impairment" as follows:
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is
treated by a covered entity as constituting such impairment; or
(2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result
of the attitudes of others toward such impairment; or
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraphs (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a
covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h). The Supreme Court acknowledged these definitions in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,279 n.4 (1987) (citing S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 37-39,63-64 (1974)). Because the focus
of these definitions is on the employer's adverse reaction to the individual, whether the individual can perform other
jobs is irrelevant. See generally Locke, supra note 3, at 115-146; Mayerson, supra note 1, at 598-609; Burgdorf,
"Substantially Limited" Protection, supra note 3 ,at 454-469.
The Court's analysis of the "regarded as disabled" prong merits its own discussion. Therefore, as stated
previously, this article is confined to the Court's treatment of the "actually disabled" prong of the disability
definition. See text accompanying notes 41-58, infra., for a discussion of the ADA's three-part definition of
disability.
19. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1) (1994).
21. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 795 (1999).
4
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determining disability on the basis of corrected impairments and will conclude that
legislative reversal is necessary.
II. RECONCILIATION OF THE DISABILITY PROVISIONS OF THE SSA AND THE ADA:
CLEVELAND V. POLICYMANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORP.
In Cleveland, the Court was asked whether an employee's receipt of Social
Security Disability Insurance ("SSDI") benefits22 creates a strong presumption
against her claim that her termination from employment violated the ADA; under
the ADA a plaintiff must show she was a "qualified individual with a disability" and
therefore could have performed her job with reasonable accommodation from the
employer.' Lower courts had been split on whether a claim of total disability under
the SSA would preclude or create a strong presumption against a claim of being
qualified for a job under the ADA.24
After suffering a stroke while working for Policy Management Systems
("PMS"), Ms. Cleveland filed an SSDI claim under the Social Security Act stating
she was totally disabled?' Before her claim was resolved, she returned to work at
PMS; consequently the claim was denied.26 Three months later, PMS fired her.27
She requested reconsideration of her SSDI denial, claiming PMS "terminated her
because she 'could no longer do the job' in light of her'condition."' 28 Cleveland was
eventually awarded SSDI benefits retroactive to the date of her stroke.29 One week
prior to the award, Cleveland sued PMS under the ADA, claiming that it "'termi-
nated' her employment without reasonably 'accommodating her disability' and that
"she requested, but was denied, accommodations such as training and additional
time to complete her work."3 The district court granted summary judgment to
PMS, ruling that Cleveland's SSDI claim created a presumption that she was totally
22. Id. SSDI benefits are available under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., to a person who can
demonstrate inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any ... physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months"' and that the impairment is "of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do
[her] previous work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind
of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy...... Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 725 (1999) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A)).
23. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 795 (1999). Title I of the ADA, governing disability discrimination in employment,
protects an employee or applicant who can show that he is a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a). Title I defines such an individual as "an individual with a disability, who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." Id. at § 12111(8). See text accompanying notes 41-58, infra.
24. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 800 (1999). For a criticism of the preclusion and estoppel cases, see Burgdorf,
"Substantially Limited" Protection, supra note 3, at 489-506.
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disabled and therefore estopped her from proving her ADA claim.3 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed.32
Justice Breyer, writing for the unanimous Court, explained that the apparent
contradiction between the two claims may not actually exist in a number of
circumstances. He outlined the differences in the analyses required by the SSA and
the ADA, as the former is designed to address massive numbers of claims, while the
latter requires a precise determination of whether an applicant can perform "the
essential functions" of ajob.33 For example, the SSA analysis can result in someone
being considered disabled and therefore eligible for benefits if that person's
impairment simply appears on a SSA list.' On the other hand, the ADA analysis
breaks down the "essential functions of the job" question even further by
determining whether such essential functions can be performed "'with reasonable
accommodation' from the employer.35 Moreover, one can, under certain
circumstances, receive SSA benefits to bridge the initial period of reentry into the
workforce, so one may not even be disabled to receive benefits. 36 Finally, one's
disability status may change over time so that the individual may actually be
capable of performing the essential functions of a job at the time an employment
decision is made regardless of having previously filed a SSA claim.37
The Court also cited the federal pleading rules, which allow inconsistent,
alternative and hypothetical claims; therefore, it reasoned, coexistent claims for
SSA and ADA benefits should not be dismissed merely because they seem
inconsistent.38 Rather, the plaintiff must proceed as any other plaintiff by making
the required showing on the claim's essential elements.39 The ADA plaintiff must
show she can perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation. If she previously asserted she is totally disabled for SSA purposes,
she must be prepared to "explain" why that assertion does not conflict with or
prevent her from making her showing under the ADA:
When faced with a plaintiffs previous sworn statement asserting "total disability"
or the like, the court should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency
with the necessary elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment,
that explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding
that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the earlier
statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential functions" of her
job, with or without "reasonable accommodation."4
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The above instruction, stated in terms of summary judgment burden, indicates that
such an "explanation" would, in essence, become an additional element of a claim
of disability discrimination when the plaintiff has previously requested SSA
disability benefits.
As stated above, however, Cleveland's holding is subject to that of Sutton,
Albertsons and Murphy; the plaintiff who previously filed a claim for SSDI benefits
will be determined to be "a qualified individual with a disability" in her medicated
state, which may obviate her claim under the ADA altogether.
Im. LIMITATION OF THE ADA's PROTECTION: SUTTON V. UNITED AIRINES,
ALBERTSONS V. KIRKINGBURG, AND MURPHY V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE
A. The Language of the ADA
a. Findings and Purposes
Congress's statements of findings and purposes, which preface the various
titles of the ADA." sweep broadly to recognize, address, and rectify myriad
obstacles encountered by individuals with disabilities, particularly in securing
meaningful employment. As will be discussed below,42 the Sutton Court focused
on the first of the findings: "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical
or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole is
growing older"'43 and indeed based its holding for the most part the first clause of
that one finding. However, that finding must be read in conjunction with the others
and with the statute as a whole.
With respect to employment, the prefatory findings focus on the many and
"increasing" numbers of individuals with disabilities who are qualified to participate
in the nation's workforce but are denied access to meaningful employment, the
various and pervasive forms of discrimination practiced against such individuals
seeking entry into the workforce or to meaningful jobs, and the compelling national
policy goals of ensuring those individuals access to the workforce.44
41. See note 4, supra, for a listing of the titles.
42. See text accompanying notes, 48-58, infra.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
44. Congress' findings with regard to employment are as follows:
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and ... such
forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem;
(3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment...
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including
outright intentional exclusion, ... overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to
existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and
relegation to lesser ... jobs, or other opportunities;
(6) people with disabilities, as a group occupy an inferior status in our society, and are severely
disadvantaged socially, vocationally, economically, and educationally;
7
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All of these findings must be read in conjunction with Congress' statements
of purpose for the ADA:
It is the purpose of this chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in
enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individu-
als with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, ... in order to address the
major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities."
These findings and purpose statements mandate a broad construction of the ADA
as well as a strong role for the various agencies interpreting and enforcing it.46
Moreover, as explained in the next section, Congress very broadly defined
"disability" in the Act as describing many more persons than those who actually
have disabilities-and it borrowed that expansive definition from preexisting
legislation. Use of Congress' prefatory estimate of the number of disabled persons
to limit the ADA's meaning of "disability" thus makes little sense in light of that
Act's broad definitional section.47
(7) individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in, and
contribute to, society;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals;
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with
disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which
our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity.
Id.
45. Id. at § 12101(b). The "sweep of congressional authority" faces challenge from state governments. The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari on the issue of whether Congress lacked authority to abrogate states' 11 th
Amendment immunity under the ADA in Garrett v. University of Alabama at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 193
F.3d 1214 (1 1" Cir. 1999), cert granted 120 S. Ct. 1669 (2000). The Court recently held in Kimel v. State Bd.
Of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), that Congress lacked such authority under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et. seq.
46. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfallfor Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 99, 137, n.190 (1999).
47. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2152 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
It is equally undeniable, however, that "43 million" is not a fixed cap on the Act's protected class: By
including the "record of' and "regarded as" categories, Congress fully expected the Act to protect
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b. Statutory Definitions of "Disability"
The ADA's definitions of "disability" were drafted verbatim from those
contained in the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,48 which
prohibits federal agencies, the United States Postal Service, and entities receiving
federal grants from discriminating against individuals with disabilities.49 Indeed,
Congress states in the text of the ADA that it is not to be construed "to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title."5
The ADA says nothing about corrective measures in its "Definitions" section
covering all titles." Section 12102(2) of the Definitions section broadly defines
"disability" in three distinct ways so as to cover individuals who have a disability,
who have had a disability in the past, and who are regarded by others as having a
disability, even though they do not:
... The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual [hereinafter referred
to as the "actually disabled prong"];
(B) a record of such an impairment [hereinafter referred to as the "no
longer disabled prong"]; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment [hereinafter referred
to as the "regarded as disabled prong"] 52
"Disability" is also a fundamental term in Title I, which proscribes discrimina-
tion in the workplace as follows:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a
disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment.53
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). The portion of the
Rehabilitation Act containing the definition of "disability" appears at § 706(8)(B). That section originally used
the word "handicap." For a comprehensive history and discussion ofinterpretations of the Rehabilitation Act, see
Burgdorf, "Substantially Limited" Protection, supra note 3, at 415-449. The same author discusses history and
analysis of the ADA in Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a
Second-Generation CivilRights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991) [hereafterreferred to as "Analysis
and Implications"].
49. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
51. Id. § 12102.
52. Id. § 12102(2). Although use of corrective measures may have a bearing on the "record of impairment" or
"regarded as impaired" prongs of the definition of "disability," this discussion will focus on its role in defining the
first prong-"actually disabled"-for it is in this definition that the fundamental questions regarding disability
determinations arise.
53. Id. § 12112(a).
20001
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Prohibited discrimination in employment takes a number of forms, including taking
adverse employment actions against a qualified employee or applicant with a
disability because of that person's disability, failing to reasonably accommodate a
qualified employee or applicant with a disability, and using employment practices
or policies that have an adverse effect on qualified individuals with a disability. 4
The definitions of "disability" from the Definitions section are embedded within
Title I's definition of "qualified individual with a disability," i.e., one who is
protected from workplace discrimination. A "qualified individual with a disability,"
defined in Section 12111(8) of Title I, is
an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires.55
Thus a determination of whether a person is entitled to the protections of Title I
mandates a two-part inquiry: first, whether the person is an "individual with a
'disability' and, second, whether the person is a "qualified individual with a
disability. '' 56  The ADA does not define key terms within its definition of
"disability." Rather, the terms "physical or mental impairment," "substantially
limits," and "major life activities" are defined in the Regulations to Implement the
54. Title I defines "discriminate" as follows:
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying ajob applicant or employee in a way that adversely affects the
opportunities or status of such applicant or employee;
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting
a covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by
this subchapter....;
(3) utilizing standards, criteria or methods of administration-
(A) that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or
(B) that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative control;
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or
association;
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business or such covered entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered entity to make
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental impairments of the employee or applicant;
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to
screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard,
test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position
in question and is consistent with business necessity; and
(f) falling to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective manner to ensure
that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who has a disability that impairs
sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever
other factor of such applicant or employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the
impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills
are the factors that the test purports to measure).
Id. § 12112(b).
55. 42U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
56. Id. § 12112(a).
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Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act 57 ("the
regulations"), promulgated by the EEOC in accordance with the notice and
comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("the APA"). 8 The
EEOC was explicitly ordered by Congress in the text of the ADA to "issue
regulations in an accessible format to carry out [Title 1] in accordance with [Title
5 of the APA]" within one year from the date of the ADA's enactment.59
B. Regulations Defining "Individual with a Disability" under the ADA
The EEOC's regulations, taken verbatim from those of the two agencies
responsible for implementing and enforcing § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,6' break
down the ADA's definition of "disability" as follows: First, a "mental or physical
impairment" is defined as
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurologi-
cal, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs),
cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-uninary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.6
Second, "major life activities" are defined in the regulations as "functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."'62 The regulations further state that these listings
are not exhaustive.63 Third, the regulations provide that an impairment "substan-
tially limits" an individual in a major life activity if he or she is:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the
general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1999).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
60. Initially, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) held this role. Its regulations appear at 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (1999). In 1980 the role was transferred to the Attorney General. Exec. Order. No. 12250, 3
C.F.R. § 298 (1981). The Justice Department regulations, still in effect, adopted the HHS regulations verbatim.
They appear at 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(1) (1998). See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
61. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (app. 1998).
62. l. § 1630.2(i).
63. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 625 (1998). The Court held in Bragdon that reproduction is a "major life activity"
within the meaning of the ADA. Id. at 639. Bragdon is discussed in the text accompanying notes 108-131, infra.
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average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.'
In determining whether a physical or mental impairment "substantially limits a
major life activity," the regulations further state that the following factors should
be considered: "(i) The nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact,
or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
impairment.
65
Thus, a determination of the threshold question of whether an individual is
disabled under the "actually disabled" prong of the ADA's definition proceeds in
three steps: first, whether the individual has a physical or mental impairment;
second, whether the impairment affects some identified major life activity; and
third, whether the impairment substantially limits that major life activity.6  Again,
the question of whether ameliorative or corrective measures should be taken into
account in determining whether an individual has a disability is not addressed in the
regulations. However, the EEOC appended to the regulations an Interpretative
Guidance on Title Iof the Americans with Disabilities Ac 67 ("the guidance"), which
was part of the regulations when they were submitted for notice and comment 8
The purpose of the guidance was to illustrate "the Commission's interpretation of
the issues discussed" and "to ensure that qualified individuals with disabilities
understand their rights under this part and to facilitate and encourage compliance
by covered entities. "69 As stated above, the EEOC's guidance interprets the ADA
as requiring that ameliorative or corrective measures not be taken into account in
determining whether an individual is disabled.
The portions of the guidance regarding the effect of ameliorative or corrective
measures address both the "impairment" step of the disability determination and the
"substantially limits" step. With regard to determining whether an individual has
a physical or mental impairment, the guidance states that "[t]he existence of an
impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as
medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices. 70 Likewise, with regard to determin-
ing whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity, the guidance
states that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in
a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to
mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."'" The
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) (app. 1998).
65. Id. § 1630.20)(2).
66. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 650 (1998).
67. 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (app. 1998).
68. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991); see also Colker, supra, note 46, at 134.
69. Introduction to 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (app.).
70. Id. § 1630.2(h) (app. 1998).
71. Id. § 1630.20) (app.).
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guidance's language is quoted directly from House and Senate reports on the ADA.72
A commentator illustrates the EEOC's rule on mitigating measures as follows:
Under the mitigating measures rule, one would ask whether an insulin-dependent
diabetic is an individual with a disability without reference to the mitigating
effects of medication on that individual's day-to-day life. Thus, a diabetic who
would fall into a coma if he or she failed to take insulin would be an individual
with a disability irrespective of whether a combination of medication, diet, and
exercise might alleviate virtually all diabetic symptoms.73
The EEOC has consistently maintained this interpretation of "disability." In
1997, it issued the EEOC Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans
with Disabilities Act,74 to "set[] forth the Commission's position on the application
of Title I of the [ADA] to individuals with psychiatric disabilities." That guidance,
although not issued by way of notice and comment procedures as was the guidance
that accompanied the EEOC's regulations, reiterates the same position on
ameliorative measures in a question-and-answer format75 . The guidance says the
following:
6. Should the Corrective Effects of Medications Be Considered in Deciding if
an Impairment is So Severe That It Substantially Limits a Major Life Activity?
No. The ADA legislative history unequivocally states that the extent to which
an impairment limits performance of a major life activity is assessed without
regard to mitigating measures, including medications. Thus, an individual who
is taking medication for a mental impairment has an ADA disability if there is
evidence that the mental impairment, when left untreated, substantially limits a
major life activity. Relevant evidence for EEOC investigators includes, for
example, a description of how an individual's condition changed when s/he went
off medication or needed to have dosages adjusted, or a description of his/her
condition before starting medication.
76
The EEOC provides the following example of a substantially limiting mental
impairment that is controlled by medication as an example of a covered disability
under the ADA:
Example B: An employee has taken medication for bipolar disorder for a few
months. For some time before starting the medication, he experienced increas-
ingly severe and frequent cycles of depression and mania; at times, he became
extremely withdrawn socially or had difficulty caring for himself. His symptoms
72. See text accompanying notesl02-07, infra.
73. Colker, supra, note 46 at 153, n.284.
74. EEOC Guidance on Psychiatric Disabilities and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 59 DALYLAB.REP.
E-1 (1977).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
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have abated with medication, but his doctor says that the duration and course of
his bipolar disorder is indefinite, although it is potentially long-term. This
employee's impairment (bipolar disorder) significantly restricts his major life
activities of interacting with others and caring for himself, when considered
without medication. The effects of his impairment are severe, and their duration
is indefinite and potentially long-term.77
The EEOC's position regarding ameliorative measures is again reflected in the
portion of the guidance explaining the duty of an employer under Title I to make a
reasonable accommodation to a qualified individual with a disability. 8 The
guidance points out that an employer is not required by the ADA to provide
corrective measures an employee may need to carry out daily activities on and off
the job such as "a prosthetic limb, wheelchair, or eyeglasses."79 That portion of the
guidance indicates that such measures or devices are in the nature of accommoda-
tions and thus to be considered with respect to the question of whether one is "a
qualified individual with a disability," which implicates the employer's duty to
reasonably accommodate, rather than the determination of whether one is "an
individual with a disability."
Other administrative bodies have interpreted the ADA to require that
ameliorative measures not be taken into account in determining disability. The
United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") has been charged by Congress to
interpret, promulgate regulations and enforce Subtitle A of Title 11, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of disability by state and local governments,"0 and Title
III, which probibits discrimination in public accommodations.8 The Department
of Transportation (DOT) was charged with the implementation of regulations and
enforcement of the transportation provisions of those titles. The appendix to the
DOJ's regulations states that "disability should be assessed without regard to the
77. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The implications of taking the effects of ameliorative measures into account
when determining disability are particularly ominous when considering mental impairments. Many devastating
mental impairments, such as bipolar disorder in the above example, are effectively controlled by medications;
however, but for the medication, persons with some kinds of mental impairments would usually not be able to work
at all. Nevertheless, the status of such mental conditions as disabling impairments remains despite the effect of
the medications.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994). Recall that Title I defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as
"one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). This definition creates a duty on the part of the
employer to "reasonably accommodate" the known disability of the individual unless the employer can show that
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer's business. This duty is codified
at id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
79. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (app. 1998) (emphasis added). This regulation derives from a statement in the Report
of the Committee on Education and Labor- "The Committee wishes to make it clear that personal use items, such
as hearing aids or eyeglasses, are not included in this provision, and therefore are not required to be provided by
employers as reasonable accommodations. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 64 (1990).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1994).
81. Id. §§ 12181-12189.
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availability of mitigating measures." 2  Likewise, the DOT makes the same
statement in its regulations.8 3
As stated previously, Congress explicitly empowered and ordered the EEOC
to issue regulations "to carry out" the provisions of Title I.84 These regulations were
to be issued within a year of the date of passage of Title V5 to give employers
another year to learn their obligations under that title before it came into effect. The
regulations and the appended guidance were promulgated in accordance with the
notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act,86 and House
and Senate reports explicitly indicated that the regulations would have "the force
and effect of law."' Indeed, the ADA provides a cause of action for violations of
Title I regulations themselves.88 Congress thus delegated to the EEOC the power
to make both legislative and interpretive rules under the ADA.89
Despite Congress' express delegation of such authority to the EEOC, the Court
found in Sutton that no agency had been delegated to interpret the ADA's general
"Definitions" section because that section precedes the various titles.90 In light of
Congress' emphasis in its findings on problems of the disabled with respect to
employment, its clear delegation of legislative and interpretive rule-making ability,
and the key role the term "disability" plays throughout the statute, such a finding
makes little sense when reading the statute as a whole.
When a delegation like that appearing in the ADA is made to an administrative
agency, the Supreme Court has stated that courts must defer to the agency's
interpretation of the statute as long as its interpretation is not "arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute. "9' In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,9' the Court reiterated the principle that an administrative
agency's duty to administer programs createdby Congress "'necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress."'93 It acknowledged that the making of policy choices in
the interpretation of statutes is properly left to the agency, as the representative of
the executive, rather than to the judiciary, because the executive is politically
accountable.94 The Court concluded:
82. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, app. A.
83. 49 CFR § 37.3 (1998).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. S. REP. No. 116, 101ST CONG., 1ST SEss. 43 (1989); see also Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the
Courts, and Employment Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L REv. 51, 69.
88. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
89. White, supra note 87, at 89.
90. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999).
91. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
92. Id. at 837.
93. Id. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
94. Id. at 865-66. The Court's recognition of the political nature of statutory interpretation is unmistakable:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts
must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of thejudges' personal
policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
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When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly
conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges--who have no constitutency--
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.95
The analysis of whether a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of a
statute under Chevron proceeds in three steps: First the court must determine
whether Congress addressed the statutory question itself. If not, "the court must
then determine whether Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency."96
This delegation may be either explicit or implicit.97 Finally, if there has been such
a delegation, "the court then determines whether the agency's construction is
permissible and therefore binding on the court."9"
Last term in Bragdon, the Court deferred to the EEOC guidance, citing
Chevron," but this term in Sutton it deemed such deference irrelevant, as it found
that Congress had addressed the issue of corrective measures in the language of the
ADA and that the EEOC guidance was contrary to the statute's language.'00
Moreover, the Sutton Court deemed examination of the ADA's legislative history--
although directly contrary to the Court's holding--irrelevant for the same reason.''
It will thus be useful to examine the legislative history of the ADA with regard to
corrective measures before discussing the Court's decisions.
C. Legislative History: What Congress SaidAbout the Meaning of"Individual
with a Disability"
The committee reports and floor debates on the ADA undisputedly reveal
Congress' intent that disability be determined without regard to corrective, or
mitigating, measures. Three committee reports flatly state that mitigating measures
are not to be taken into account when determining whether a person is disabled." 2
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration's views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch
of the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.
Id. For a complete analysis of Chevron's reasoning that statutory interpretation is better entrusted to "the politically
accountable agency," as well as commentators' reactions to Chevron, see White, supra note 87, at 76-79.
95. 467 U.S. at 866.
96. White, supra note 87, at 79.
97. Id.
98. Id
99. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 626 (1998). For a discussion of how the Court applied Chevron in Bragdon, see
Colker, supra note 46, at 151-152.
100. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,480 (1999).
101. Id. at482.
102. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at23 (1989); H.R. RaP. No. 101-485, pt. II at 52 (1990); H.R. REP. No. 101-485,
pt. M11 at 28 (1990).
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These reports are cited as authority in the EEOC guidance section on how to
determine whether an individual is impaired.03 But the reports' statements
regarding mitigating measures are not limited simply to the "impairment" step of
disability determination. Two of the three reports speak in terms of determining the
ultimate question of disability when discussing consideration of mitigating
measures. The Senate Report, in its overall discussion of the "actually disabled
prong" of the ADA disability definition, states: "Moreover, whether a person has
a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."'" The House
Labor Report makes the same statement and provides examples:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the
availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or
auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially
limited in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be
corrected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments,
such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are
covered under the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of
the impairment are controlled by medication.
105
The House Judiciary Report reiterates that point under the heading "Substantial
limitation of a major life activity." The report states, "The impairment should be
assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as auxiliary aids
or reasonable accommodations, would result in a less-than-substantial limitation." 06
In an exchange on the floor about coverage of mental illness, Senator Harkin,
one of the authors of the Senate Bill, cited the following examples of disabilities
controlled by medication that would be covered by the ADA:
... in cases where a person has a disability, let us say schizophrenia, the employer
has obviously every right to determine what that disability is and whether or not
it would affect the performance of that person's job. If it did, then the employer
could say this person was not qualified. If, however, the disability in question,
whether schizophrenia, manic-depressive or whatever it might be is, let us say,
controlled by drugs, and the person is under a doctor's care, and the person is
qualifiedfor the job, then the employer can say, "Well, I am not going to hire you
based on your disability," but the employee then would be able to go to the
EEOC and file a complaint and show, A. that that employee is qualified; B. that
the disability in question does not inhibit his or her performance on that job.1 7
103. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (app. 1998).
104. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) (emphasis added).
105. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. u at 52 (1990) (emphasis added).
106. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III at 28 (1990).
107. 101 CONG. REc. S19864 (1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (emphasis added).
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The foregoing statutory language, regulations and legislative history pertaining
to the definition of "disability" in the ADA resulted in two divergent opinions
regarding the meaning of that term.
D. The Court's Divergent Analyses of "Disability"
a. Bragdon v. Abbott
As stated previously, Bragdon provided the Court with its first opportunity to
interpret the meaning of "individual with a disabilty" under the ADA. The case
posed the question of whether someone who has the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV"), but is asymptomatic, is "an individual with a disability." ' Dr.
Bragdon refused Ms. Abbott dental services in his office after she revealed she was
HIV-positive but at that time suffered no serious symptoms of the infection.'0 9
Bragdon offered to fill her tooth in a hospital in accordance with his infectious
disease policy,110 but Abbott declined and sued him under Title III of the ADA,
which prohibits disability-based discrimination by private entities that operate
public accommodations."'
With regard to the issue of disability, the questions presented by both parties
focused on the issue of whether someone who is infected with HIV but asymptom-
atic is "per se disabled.""' 2 They did not ask the broader questions of whether
someone is disabled if that person has some other medical condition but is
asymptomatic, or if the person does not exhibit symptoms because the condition is
controlled by medicine." 3
108. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624 (1998).
109. See id.
110. Seeid.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994). As explained at the outset of this article, the same definition of "disability"
applies to all titles of the ADA. Id. § 12102.
112. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at ii, Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)(No. 97-156)[hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner] The Court did not answer this question, as it found that Abbott's HIV infection limited her major
life activity of reproduction:
Testimony from the respondent that her HIV infection controlled her decision not to have a child is
unchallenged.... Respondent's HIV infection is a physical impairment which substantially limits a
major life activity, as the ADA defines it. In view of our holding, we need not address the second
question presented, i.e., whether HIV infection is a per se disability under the ADA.
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641 (1998).
However, as will be discussed, the Court cited with approval judicial and agency authority, as well as
congressional reports, that considered asymptomatic HIV infection to be a disability without considering its effect
on the individual.
113. The briefs-in-chief contained only one allusion to the issue of whether a person is disabled if his or her
condition is controlled by medication. Dr. Bragdon's brief cited in a footnote to a discussion of legislative history
some district court opinions concluding that statements in the Congressional Committee reports about not taking
ameliorative measures into account in determining disability are inconsistent with the plain language of the ADA.
Brief for Petitioner at 39, n. 31.
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Significantly, however, several congressmen who "were primary authors and
sponsors of' the ADA filed an amicus brief on behalf of Abbott.14 This brief
addressed the more general questions of whether conditions that are asymptomatic
or are controlled by medication can nevertheless constitute disabilities. These
"authors and sponsors" of the ADA emphatically answer these questions in the
positive:
Petitioner's argument that, in passing the ADA, Congress intended to condone
discrimination against an individual with asymptomatic HIV infection based on
unfounded fear of contagion, threatens the very core of the ADA. With the
advance of technology, many individuals with a variety of disabilities from
epilepsy to schizophrenia are or will become asymptomatic. [Footnote:] It is for
this reason that the Committee Reports and authoritative agency regulations
require limitations to be assessed without regard to mitigating measures. [End
footnote.] To argue that Congress intended to strip them of anti-discrimination
protection for this reason is not only illogical, but also totally ignores Congress'
recognition that disability status alone often invokes discrimination.'1 5
Another of the original authors of the ADA stated the following in response to the
issues presented in Bragdon before that case was decided: "It would be the height
of irony if the medicines that enabled people to do their jobs and engage in society
were then used to deny such individuals anti-discrimination coverage because they
were not disabled."'n6 Unfortunately, that irony surfaced in the Court's second
attempt to interpret the term "disability."
The Bragdon Court briefly mentioned the broader question of whether to
consider ameliorative measures in determining disability but declined to decide it. 7
In holding that an individual with asymptomatic HIV infection is disabled under the
ADA, Justice Kennedy, writing for a majority of five, 8 adhered to the Act's plain-
language mandate "to apply [no] lesser standard than the standards applied under
114. Brief of Senators Harkin, Keffords, and Kennedy and of Representatives Hoyer, Owens and Waxman as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents [sic] at 1.
115. Id. at 5-6 and n.4. (Emphasis added.)
116. Statement of Professor Chai Feldblum quoted in Ellen Goodman, AIDS and ADA, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
April 5, 1998, at D7.
117. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624 (1998). The Court noted that in argument over whether HIV infection alone
substantially limits an individual, Dr. Bragdon asserted that the risk of transmitting the virus from mother to infant
could be reduced with antiretroviral therapy from twenty-five to eight percent. It then noted that the Solicitor
General, in an amicus brief on behalf of Ms. Abbott, "questions the relevance of the 8% figure, pointing to
regulatory language requiring the substantiality of a limitation to be assessed without regard to mitigating
measures." Id. But the Court sidestepped the issue of whether to take ameliorative measures into account in
determining substantial limitation, stating, "We need not resolve this dispute in order to decide this case, however.
It cannot be said as a matter of law that an 8% risk of transmitting a dread and fatal disease to one's child does not
represent a substantial limitation on reproduction." Id.
118. The othersjoining the opinion wereJustices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer. ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia, Thomas and O'Connor dissented from the holding that HIV infection substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction, stating that Abbott had not shown "that any of her major life activities were
substantially limited by her HIV infection," criticizing the majority for not making an individualized determination
as to Abbott herself. Id. at 657 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote a separate dissent, stating
that reproduction is not a major life activity. Id. at 665 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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title V of the Rehabilitation Act ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies
pursuant to such title."'19 The Court first noted that the ADA's definitions of
"individual with a disability" are derived "almost verbatim" from those of
"handicapped individual" in the 1974 amendments to the Rehabilitation Act and that
of "handicap" in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.20 It therefore
examined those statutes' regulations with regard to the key terms "mental or
physical impairment," "major life activities," and "substantially limits." First it
examined the regulations defining "physical or mental impairment." '' Even though
HIV infection had not been identified at the time the Department of Justice (DOJ)
issued regulations interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, the Court cited medical
evidence detailing the course of the infection and found that it "fall[s] well within
the general definition [of physical impairment] set forth by the regulations."' 22
The Court next considered the parties' focus on reproduction as a "major life
activity." Again looking to the Rehabilitation Act regulations, it rejected Bragdon's
argument that "major life activity" in the ADA's definition of "disability" is
restricted to activities having a "public, economic, or daily character." '23 That
argument, the Court stated, is inconsistent with the regulations' "representative
list" 24 of "major life activities": "The [regulations'] inclusion of activities such as
caring for one's self and performing manual tasks belies the suggestion that a task
must have a public or economic character."'" The Court further found that
reproduction is "no less important than" the included activities of working and
learning.
126
With regard to the third step of the disability determination, whether the
physical or mental impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activity,
the Court observed that the Rehabilitation Actregulations did not address this issue.
Therefore, it looked at medical evidence regarding the effects of HIV infection on
reproduction and then applied a customary method of statutory interpretation by
119. 42U.S.C. § 12201.
In construing the statute, we are informed by interpretations of parallel definitions in previous statutes
and the views of various administrative agencies which have faced this interpretive question....
Congress' repetition of a well-established term carries the implication that Congress intended the term
to be construed in accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations.... In this case, Congress did
more than suggest this construction; it adopted a specific statutory provision in the ADA directing [it]....
Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 631, 632 (1998).
120. Id. at 624 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988) and 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1988)).
121. Id. at 632. Those regulations, along with commentary, were first promulgated by the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare ("HEW"), the agency initially responsible for interpreting the Rehabilitation Act; later the
regulations were adopted verbatim, with the commentary incorporated into their text, in 1980 by the Department
of Justice ("DOJ"), which now administers that Act and has adhered to the same regulations to date. Id. at 633.
As stated previously, the ADA definitions of "disability" are derived verbatim from the Rehabilitation Act
regulations. See text accompanying notes 48-49, supra. Likewise, the ADA regulations defining terms within the
definitions are derived from the same regulations. The ADA regulations defining "physical or mental impairment"
are set out in the text accompanying note 61, supra.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 638.
124. The ADA regulations presenting examples of "major life activities," which are the same as the
Rehabilitation Act regulations, are set out in the text accompanying notes 62-63, supra.
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examining the following sources: agency interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act
and the Fair Housing Amendments, including administrative guidance and
commentary, lower courts' interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, agency guidance
interpreting the ADA, including that set out in the EEOC's Interpretive Manual, and
legislative history. 7 Finding virtual unanimity among all these sources, the Court
held that asymptomatic HIV infection "is an impairment that substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction."'28
A commentator has observed that Bragdon's analysis "makes clear that lower
courts should accord substantial deference to agency views under the ADA."'29
Applying Bragdon's analysis to the EEOC's guidance on mitigating measures, she
explains, "should involve a two-step process. First, one should inquire about the
status of that rule under prior section 504 regulations and case law. Second, one
should inquire about the status of that rule under current ADA regulations."'30 In
Sutton, however, the Court virtually ignored Bragdon, citing it only as support for
its rule that disability determinations must be made on an individual basis."'1
b. Sutton v. United Airlines, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, and
Albertsons v. Kirkingbird
In each of the three disability cases this term, the plaintiffs had been denied
jobs because of their uncorrected impairments. Sutton involved twin sisters who,
despite being severely myopic, were certified pilots. Both had uncorrected vision
of "20/200 or worse in her right eye and 20/400 or worse in her left eye,"132 but both
wore lenses that corrected their vision to "20/20 or better."'33 They applied for
commercial pilot positions with United Airlines. Both met United's qualifications
with respect to age, education and experience, and both were certified by the
Federal Aviation Administration. " However, United further required that its pilots
have uncorrected vision no worse than 20/100.' Because they did not meet the
uncorrected vision requirement, United did not offer them the positions. 6
In Murphy and Albertsons, both plaintiffs were denied mechanic and driver
positions, respectively, because their uncorrected impairments did not qualify them
for federal Department of Transportation (DOT) certification. Murphy had suffered
from hypertension since childhood. His unmedicated blood pressure was 250/160,
but with his medication, his doctor testified, his "'hypertension does not signifi-
cantly restrict his activities ... and in general he can function normally and can
127. Id at 631
128. Id. at 641-42.
129. Colker, supra note 46, at 150.
130. Id. at 154.
131. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,483 (1999)..
132. Id. at 475.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 475-476.
135. See id. at476.
136. Id. at 476.
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engage in activities that other persons normally do."' 137 United Parcel Service
(UPS) hired Murphy as a mechanic. DOT certification was a qualification for that
job, but in order to be certified, one could not have a "'current clinical diagnosis of
high blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial
vehicle safely."'1 38 Murphy had been mistakenly issued DOT certification, even
though at the time he was hired by UPS his blood pressure of 186/24 exceeded DOT
requirements.'39 UPS later discovered the error, retested him and found his blood
pressure to be 160/10 2 .14' As a result, it fired him because it believed his blood
pressure exceeded DOT requirements. 4 ' Plaintiff Kirkingburg, initially hired by
Albertsons as a truck driver, suffered a similar fate. He had many years of
experience and performed well on the company's driving test, despite having
monocular vision.1 The DOT requires interstate truck drivers to possess
"corrected distant visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye and distant binocular
acuity of at least 20/40.""1  Although Kirkingburg's vision did not meet these
requirements, Albertsons' physician mistakenly certified him.'" More than two
years later, when he returned from a leave of absence, the company physician told
him his vision did not meet DOT requirements. Albertsons then fired him.
Kirkingburg subsequently received a waiver from the DOT of its vision require-
ments,'45 but Albertson's would not rehire him. 146
Justice O'Connor, Sutton's author, was one of the dissenters in Bragdon who
criticized the majority inter alia for failing to individualize the effect of HIV
infection on Abbott's reproductive capability. 147 She used this criticism as a basis
for her holding in Sutton that the EEOC's guidance regarding mitigating measures
is contrary to the plain language of the ADA 48 and that mitigating measures must
137. Murphyv. UnitedParcelService,527U.S. 516,527(1999) (quotingMurphyv. UnitedParcel Service, Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 872, 875 (D. Kan. 1996)).




142. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558 (1999). The medical term for Kirkingburg's vision
impairment is "amblyopia," causing him to have 20/200 vision in one eye. Id. at 559.
143. Id. at 558-559 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(10) (1998)). The Court explains the term "visual acuity"
at ia at 559, n.2.
144. Id. at 559.
145. The DOT had begun a waiver program four months prior to Kirkingburg's firing in which applicants whose
vision did not meet DOT requirements could nevertheless receive certification if they
had three years of recent experience driving a commercial vehicle without a license suspension or
revocation, involvement in a reportable accident in which the applicant was cited for a moving
violation, conviction for certain driving-related offenses, citation for certain serious traffic violations,
or more than two convictions for any other moving violations. A waiver applicant had to agree to have
his vision checked annually for deterioration, and to report certain information about his driving
experience to the Federal Highway Administration....
Id. at 560 (citing 57 Fed. Reg. 31458, 31460-61 (1992)).
146. Id.
147. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 664-65 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). O'Connor
also joined the other dissenters in faulting the majority for finding that reproduction is a major life activity. Id.
148. Sutton overruled seven of the nine circuits that had deferred to the EEOC's guidance in holding that
ameliorative measures should not be taken into account in determining whether one is "an individual with a
disability." The EEOC's guidance was followed in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh
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be considered when determining disability.'4 9 O'Connor based this conclusion on
three provisions of the Act "read in concert"15 and on "[looking at the Act as a
whole"'51: the "present indicative verb form" of the ADA's overall definition of
"disability"5 2; the same definition's use of the phrase "of such individual"'53; and
the language in the preface of the ADA stating Congress' finding that "some
43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older." '54 A closer
examination of these provisions indicates, however, that the language of the ADA
is not as plain as the Court reads it.
Recall that the "actually disabled" prong of the three-part definition of
"disability" in § 12102(2)(A) of the ADA states: "The term 'disability' means, with
Circuits, which considered a number of different impairments and mitigating measures. Diabetes mellitus
controlled by insulin was held to be a disability in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-866
(1st Cir. 1998); the same condition was assumed a disability in Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 696
(5th Cir. 1995) (citing the guidance). On a certified question of whether the guidance should be accepted, the Fifth
Circuit held that Adult Stills Disease (a form of rheumatoid arthritis) controlled by medicine must be assessed in
its nonmedicated state. Washington v. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464,470-471 (5th Cir. 1998).
Epilepsy controlled by medication was held to create a question of fact as to disability in Matczak v. Frankford
Candy and Chocolate Co., 133 F.3d 933,937-938 (3d Cir. 1997) (accepting the guidance). Strabismus (crossed
eyes) improved by a contact lens was held not to be a disability under the guidance in Roth v. Lutheran General
Hospital, 57 F.3d 1446, 1448 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Baert v. EuclidBeverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 933,937-938 (7th
Cir. 1998). Monocular vision was held to be a disability by the Eighth Circuit, Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d
624, 625,628 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, and to create a question of fact in Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143
F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd 527 U.S. 555 (1999); see also Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362,
364, 366 (9th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Circuit, citing the guidance, held that Graves' Disease (of the thyroid
gland) controlled by medication created a fact question as to disability in Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102
F.3d 516, 517, 523 (llth Cir. 1996).
On the other hand, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits rejected the EEOC's guidance: Non-insulin-dependent
diabetes mellitus controlled by medicine, diet and exercise was held to create a question of fact as to disability, but
two judges rejected the third's opinion accepting the guidance in Gilda v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, (6th Cir.
1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected the guidance in
the subject cases, Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1998), affd 527 U.S. 516
(1999), and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997), affd 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
149. Consequently, because the Suttons' visual impairments were corrected to 20/20 by corrective lensess, and
Murphy's blood pressure was controlled enough, according to his doctor's testimony, to enable him to function
normally, none of these plaintiffs were disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Murphy might have avoided the
issue altogether, however, had he claimed he was disabled even when taking his medicine. Presumably he was
taking it when UPS fired him because of high blood pressure readings. Indeed, the Court noted that Murphy could
have challenged the Tenth Circuit's finding that he was not substantially limited when medicated, but he did not:
Because the question whether petitioner is "disabled" when taking medication is not before us, we have
no occasion here to consider whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite his
medication or the negative side effects of his medication.
Murphy, 527 U.S. 516, 521(1999).
Another interesting aspect of Murphy is that Justice O'Connor, its author, presented the question on
mitigating measures as "whether the determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating
measures he employs." Id. This raises the question of whether the mitigating measures the person "employs" must
rise to some level of adequacy or appropriateness before the person would be covered by the ADA. As discussed
infra, as a result of Sutton courts are not only assessing individuals' impairments in their mitigated state, but are
deciding whether individuals who do not use mitigating measures should be using them. See text accompanying
notes 243-250, infra
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respect to an individual--(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;.. " 155 The Court
construed the statute's use of the verb "limits" in its "present indicative verb form"
to "requir[e] that a person be presently--not potentially or hypothetically--
substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. '156 The Court explained:
A "disability" exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a major life
activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" be substantially limiting if
mitigating measures were not taken. A person whose physical or mental
impairment is corrected by medication or other measures does not have an
impairment that presently "substantially limits" a major life activity. To be sure,
a person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures still has an impairment, but if the impairment is corrected it does not
"substantially limit" a major life activity."'57
The Court's acknowledgment that the individual "still has an impairment"
within the meaning of "disability" belies the logic of its conclusion, however. First,
a forthright grammatical analysis of subpart (A) of the definition of "disability"
reveals a most common structure: The subject of the clause is "impairment"; the
verb, or predicate, is "limits," a transitive verb; and the noun "activities" completes
the predicate, which is required by the transitive verb. 58 The clause distilled to its
base sentence structure becomes impairment limits activities. The adjectives
"physical or mental" and "major life" simply describe the nouns "impairment" and
"activities," respectively. The adverb "substantially" describes the verb "limits."'159
Putting these pieces back together, it is the individual's "mental or physical
impairment" that "substantially limits" the "majorlife activities of such individual."
Thus, if an individual's impairment is determined under the ADA's definition of
"disability" without regard to mitigating measures, as the Court indicates, the entire
clause comprising subpart (A) of the disability definition must be interpreted
without regard to mitigating measures because it is the impairment that substantially
limits one's major life activities. The question of whether mitigating measures are
to be considered goes to the interpretation of the noun "impairment," not the verb
clause "substantially limits."'60 For the Court's holding to be logical from a plain-
155. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
156. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482 (1999).
157. Id. at 482-483 (emphasis added).
158. See, e.g., HANS P. GUTH, NEw ENGLISH HANDBOOK, 2d ed., at 26 (1985).
159. See, e.g., id. at 20.
160. Cf Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (Ist Cir. 1998). The portion of the guidance that
addresses the effect of mitigating measures on determining whether an individual is substantially limited would
thus appear to be extraneous, or added for emphasis. Indeed, a commentator explains that the guidance originally
issued for notice and comment referred to mitigating measures "in the context of defining an impairment, but not
in the context of defining a substantial limitation." Reference to use of mitigating measures in determining whether
one is substantially limited appeared in the guidance appended to the EEOC's final rules:
In its final rule, the EEOC wrote specifically on the mitigating measures issue. As it explained in its
comments,
the Commission has revised the Interpretive Guidance accompanying § 1630.2(j) tomake clear that
[Vol. 35:505528
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language grammatical standpoint, then, Congress would have had to have modified
"impairment" with the adjectives "mitigated" or "corrected." The Court's "present
indicative verb form" reading of "limits" requires a sleight of hand that changes the
meaning of "impairment" to "impairment that is mitigated."
Second, the Court's reading of the clause as requiring consideration of
mitigating measures mischaracterizes the nature of a mitigated impairment. If one
has an impairment, even though it may be corrected, there is nothing "hypothetical"
or "potential" about it to that person. For example, if one of the Sutton sister's
glasses were knocked off, she would certainly experience the substantially limiting
effect of her visual impairment. If Murphy forgot to take his blood pressure
medicine, he would experience the substantially limiting effect of his impairment
of severe hypertension. If Kirkingbird's impairment of monocular vision prevented
him from accurately gauging the distance between his truck and the vehicle ahead
in order to avoid a collision, he would likewise experience its substantially limiting
effects. As a matter of fact, the extent to which an individual's impairment is
mitigated may often be aprecise measure of the limiting effects of the impairment
on that individual and thus a measure of whether the impairmentsubstantially limits
that individual. 1
61
The second portion of the statute the Court relied on to support its holding is
the use of the word "individual" in the same definition, but the Court's logic does
not reveal the clarity it attributes to that language. Citing Bragdon and the EEOC's
appendix to its regulations interpreting Title I of the ADA, the Court determined
that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized
inquiry. '"162 Thus, the Court continued,
The agency guidelines' directive that persons be judged in their uncorrected or
unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized inquiry mandated by
the ADA. The agency approach would often require courts and employers to
speculate about a person's condition and would, in many cases, force them to
make a disability determination based on general information about how an
uncorrected impairment usually affects individuals, rather than on the individual's
actual condition.63
the determination of whether an impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities is
to be made without regard to the availability of medicines, assistive devices, or other mitigating
measures. This interpretation is consistent with the legislative history of the ADA.
Accordingly, the EEOC added the following sentence to the interpretive guidance: "The determination
of whether an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case
basis, without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devices."
Colker, supra note 46 at 154-155 (emphasis added).
161. The Suttons did not allege that their major life activity of seeing was substantially limited. Instead, they
claimed to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working. See note 18g,supra.
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Again, however, the Court did not explain how such a determination is "specula-
tive."1  Furthermore, the Court failed to acknowledge that differences in the
limiting effects of impairments from one individual to another can be determined:
For instance, under this view, courts would almost certainly find all diabetics to
be disabled, because if they failed to monitor their blood sugar levels and
administer insulin, they would almost certainly be substantially limited in one or
more major life activities. A diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her
daily activities would therefore be considered disabled simply because he or she
has diabetes. Thus, the guidelines [sic] approach would create a system in which
persons often must be treated as members of a group of people with similar
impairments, rather than as individuals. This is contrary to both the letter and the
spirit of the ADA. 65
The Court's "plain language" analysis supporting its conclusion that
disabilities must be determined on an individual basis derives from the general
"Definitions" section's use of thephrases "with respect to an individual" and "major
life activities of such individual."66 Equally plausible, however, is a plain-language
reading of those phrases within the definition as contemplating the use throughout
the statute of the phrase "individual with a disability" to denote the class protected
by the statute. As the Court pointed out in Bragdon, the latter phrase was adopted
from the Rehabilitation Act's phrase "handicapped individual."' 67 In devising the
phrase to be used in the ADA, however, Congress substituted the word "disability"
for the outmoded word "handicap" and determined that the abilities of such
individuals should be emphasized rather than their disabilities. Therefore, instead
of the phrase "disabled individual" it used the phrase "individual with a disability"
to denote the class protected by the ADA. 16' The terms used in the statute's
definition of "disability" ("with respect to an individual" and "of such individual")
could then be read as simply conforming to subsequent language in the statute
("individual with a disability").
The Court apparently recognized the insufficiency of its "plain language"
reading, however, as it turned to precedent and agency interpretation to bolster its
conclusion. It first cited Bragdon as an indirect source for its conclusion, indicating
thatBragdon "declin[ed] to consider whether HIV infection is a per se disability.' 69
Clearly Bragdon indicates that the Court had not yet ruled on the issue of whether
the ADA recognizes certain impairments as per se disabilities. But the point that an
individualized determination of disability must be made was asserted by Bragdon's
164. Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Writing the Law of Work on Nero's Pillars: The 1998-99 Term of the U.S. Supreme
Court, 15 THE LABOR LAWYER 181, 188, n.42.
165. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483-484 (1999).
166. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
167. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).
168. See Burgdorf, "Substantially Limited" Protection, supra note 3 at 527-528; Burgdorf, Analysis and
Implications, supra, note 15 at 414, n.7.
169. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (1999) (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
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dissenters-i.e. Sutton's majority. Indeed agency and judicial interpretative authority
cited by the Bragdon majority consider HIV infection per se disability under both
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.
The only direct source cited for the Court's conclusion is a portion of the
EEOC guidance explaining the term "substantially limits," which the Court then
used to invalidate the portion of the same guidance regarding mitigating measures.
(Interestingly, the Court cited the EEOC's guidance despite its finding, discussed
below, that the EEOC was not authorized to interpret the ADA's general definition
of "disability.1 70 ) However, the language cited from the guidance hedges on the
issue of whether disability must be determined on an individual basis: "'The
determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on
the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of
that impairment on the life of the individual."'
' 171
As Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent, Sutton would require that an
individualized determination be made as to whether someone who wears a
prosthesis replacing part of his leg is "an individual with a disability" within the
meaning of the ADA.172 To illustrate, he compared the abilities of a hypothetical
injured worker or war veteran wearing a prosthesis to those of "an average couch
potato":
With the aid of prostheses, coupled with courageous determination and physical
therapy, many of these hardy individuals can perform all of their major life
activities just as efficiently as the average couch potato. If the Act were just
concerned with their present ability to participate in society, many of these
individuals' physical impairments would not be viewed as disabilities. Similarly,
if the statute were solely concerned with whether these individuals viewed
themselves as disabled--or with whether a majority of employers regarded them
as unable to perform most jobs--many of these individuals would lack statutory
protection from discrimination based on their prostheses.'
The majority could muster only an equivocal response to Stevens' argument:
The use of a corrective device does not, by itself, relieve one's
disability. Rather, one has a disability under subsection A if, notwith-
standing, the use of a corrective device, that individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity. For example, individuals who use
prosthetic limbs or wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of
functioning in society but still be disabled because of a substantial
limitation on their ability to walk or run.... The use or nonuse of a
corrective device does not determine whether an individual is disabled;
170. See text accompanying notes 194-199, infra.
171. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (1999) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (app.) (emphasis added).
172. Id. at498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 497-498 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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that determination depends on whether the limitations an individual
with an impairment actually faces are in fact substantially limiting. 74
Under the majority's analysis, Stevens' hypothetical veteran, or indeed someone
whose abilities exceed those of the average person, would surely not be disabled
under the ADA. For example, neither the late Terry Fox, who for 144 days ran a
marathon (26 miles) a day across Canada on an artificial leg and inspired many
other amputees to take up running,'7 5 nor Heather Mills, who runs half-marathons,
snowboards, skis and skates using a prosthesis for half of a leg,176 would be disabled
under the ADA.
A commentator points out the inadequacy of the above response to Stevens'
criticism:
The Court does not quite prove Justice Stevens is wrong. It merely shows that
he is not necessarily or inevitably right.... The Court relies on individualized,
case-by-case, person-by-person inquiry guided by the phrase "substantially
limits".... [It] all but admits that in some cases, some individuals without limbs,
but using a prosthesis, might not be disabled within the meaning of the Act.'77
Stevens further explained that the Court's individualized analysis is contra-
dicted by the Act's three-part definition of disability, which belies the accuracy of
the Court's construction of the Act "as a whole":
If the Court is correct that "[a] 'disability' exists only where" a person's "present"
or "actual" condition is substantially impaired, there would be no reason to
include in the protected class those who were once disabled but who are now
fully recovered. Subsection (B) of the Act's definition, however, plainly covers
a person who previously had a serious hearing impairment that has since been
completely cured. Still ... it holds that one who continues to wear a hearing aid
that she has worn all her life might not be covered--fully cured impairments are
covered, but merely treatable ones are not. The text of the Act surely does not
require such a bizarre result.
178
174. Il at 488. The Court's reference to running as a major life activity is far more generous than the EEOCs
interpretation of that phrase; the regulations do not list running as a major life activity. It is difficult to imagine
a class ofjobs other than professional sports for which running is a qualification and for whose participants running
is a major life activity. Surely the average person cannot be a professional athlete, and running is not a major life
activity of such person. Avid exercisers may view running as a major life activity, but certainly the average person
(couch potato?) does not.
175. See, e.g., Frank Calleja, Terry Fox's Mother Holds His Torch High, THE TORONTO STAR (September ,
1999).
176. See, e.g., Leslie Doolittle, McCartney and Ex-Model "Are an Item, "THE ORLANDO SENTINEL A-2 (March
16, 2000).
177. Tepker, supra note 164, at 191.
178. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,498-499 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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The Court itself displayed some confusion about the application of its
individualized analysis when it confronted inAlbertsons a plaintiff with monocular
vision. Unlike the plaintiffs in the other two cases, Kirkingburg employed neither
a corrective device nor medication; "mitigation" consisted of his brain's adjustment
to the impaired eye.' In that case the Court came very close to admitting that some
impairments are by their nature substantially limiting. Justice Souter, writing for
the majority, attempted to bring Kirkingburg's impairment within Sutton's rule:
While some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a major
life activity, we cannot say that monocularity does.... This is not to suggest that
monocular individuals have an onerous burden in trying to show that they are
disabled. On the contrary, our brief examination of some of the medical
literature leaves us sharing the Government's judgment that people with
monocular vision "ordinarily" will meet the Act's definition of disability, and we
suppose that defendant companies will often not contest the issue. We simply
hold that the Act requires monocular individuals, like others claiming the Act's
protection, to prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the
limitation in terms of their own experience ... is substantial. 8 '
The Court does not explain what it means when it says the burden of proof of
disability for monocular persons is not "onerous." But it is surely much less
onerous than the burden imposed by Sutton's rule on individuals like Fox or Mills,
who would be hard pressed, despite their amputated legs, to prove disability by
offering evidence that the extent of their limitations in terms of their own
experience is substantial. Moreover, by creating a heightened primafacie burden
on employees claiming to be disabled, the Court has ensured that employers will
"contest the issue" in virtually every case.
The final and "critical" provision of the ADA upon which the Court based its
plain language reading is from the Act's preface, which states that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is
increasing as the population as a whole is growing older."18' That language, the
Court concluded, "is evidence that the ADA's coverage is restricted to only those
whose impairments are not mitigated by corrective measures." 182 It opined that had
"Congress intended to include all persons with corrected physical limitations among
those covered by the Act, it undoubtedly would have cited a much higher number
of disabled persons in the findings."'1 3 Yet the Court admitted it could not identify
the precise source of the 43,000,000 figure and therefore how the figure was derived
and, significantly, Congress' intent in using that figure.184 Rather than being a
179. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999).
180. Id. at 566-567 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
181. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,484 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)).
182. Id. at 487.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 484-486.
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definitive "plain language" indication of Congress' intent, the prefatory language
was revealed by the Court to be a mere "clue" as to Congress' intent.'85
The author of the article cited by the Court as containing an accurate estimate
of the number of disabled persons'816 had expressed his own doubts about the
adequacy of that figure in the very article the Court cited. Professor Robert
Burgdorf, a drafter of the ADA, wrote in his 1991 article analyzing the newly
enacted ADA that the 43,000,000 figure has a "dubious derivation" and is only a
"rough estimate."'87 Moreover, the Court focused solely on the first clause of the
finding and ignored the remaining clause, "and this number is increasing as the
population as a whole is growing older,"'88 despite the fact that the quoted figure's
source appeared around 1986,189 and likely the data were obtained earlier than that.
The higher numbers that are derived from "nonfunctional approaches to defining
disability" were cited by the Court from sources dating in the late 1990's. 19 ' No
accounting was made by the Court in 1999 for the number of disabled persons
increasing with passing years or differences in accuracy of devices used to count
such persons.
Moreover, as Stevens pointed out in dissent, 43,000,000 could not have been
meant as a "fixed cap on the Act's protected class," as Congress defined "disability"
to include not only those who are actually disabled but those who have a record of
disability or are regarded as having a disability. 91 And, as explained above, this
three-part definition was adopted from the Rehabilitation Act, 92 which Congress
certainly was aware of at the time it drafted the ADA.
Perhaps the most astounding pronouncement in Sutton was its finding that no
agency had been delegated by Congress to interpret the overall "Definitions" section
of the ADA. The only basis for this conclusion appears to derive from the Court's
determination to view the Act "as a whole." The Court blithely stated that "the
terms and structure of the ADA" belies the conclusion that the EEOC was delegated
authority to interpret the meaning of "disability" because Congress placed its
definitions in a section preceding the sections containing Title I and the other titles
of the Act.'93 This finding laid the predicate for the Court to ignore the statute's
explicit language delegating authority to the various agencies to interpret and
enforce the ADA. The majority dismissed Justice Breyer's common-sense
185. See Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, stating
[t]he strongest clues to Congress' perception of the domain of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA),
as I see it, are legislative findings that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or
mental disabilities," and that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority," persons
"subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society."
Id. at 494 (Ginsburg, L, concurring) (emphasis added).
186. See id. at 484.
187. Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 48 at 434-435, n.l 17.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (1994).
189. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 485 (1999).
190. Id. at 487.
191. 42U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
192. See text accompanying notes 48-49, supra.
193. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479 (1999).
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explanation for the placement of the "Definitions" section as "imaginative." '194 Yet
the Court failed to explain what is "imaginative" about Congress' "stylistic"
placement of the definition of a term that appears in all the titles in front of those
titles, with the intent that the various agencies interpret the common term as it
pertains to other language in the title they have been assigned to interpret and
enforce. 95 Under Breyer's interpretation, the "Definitions" section becomes a part
of each title, for it surely has no meaning separate from the context each title
provides. Rather than repeating the disability definitions within each title, Congress
simply wrote them once at the beginning of the Act. Under the Court's reading of
the statute, however, the "Definitions" section stands alone; agencies must interpret
and enforce their respective titles containing the term "disability" with no guidance
from Congress other than the definition itself. Again, the Court had to construe the
Act as containing this interpretive gap in order to ignore Congress' explicit
delegations of authority to governmental agencies.
Yet the Court had previously recognized in School Board of Nassau County
v. Arline96 that the "primary focus" of the Rehabilitation Act was access to
employment for individuals with disabilities. The Court pointed out that the
"original definition of the term handicapped individual' reflected this focus by
including only those whose disability limited their employability, and those who
could be expected to benefit from vocational rehabilitation." '197 Enhancement of
employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities was thus a major goal of
this legislation, and Congress defined the class protected by the Act with this goal
in mind. As stated previously, the definitions of "individual with a disability" in the
ADA were drawn verbatim from those of "handicapped individual" in the
Rehabilitation Act. Moreover, Congress' findings describe hurdles faced by
individuals with disabilities in employment.'98 To divorce the ADA's definition of
"individual with a disability" from the employment context, as the Court did in
Sutton when it proclaimed that Congress did not authorize the EEOC to interpret
that definition, is simply misleading.
Most significantly, the Court's manner of interpreting the ADA "as a whole"
by picking and choosing terms to suit its ends ignores Congress' explicit direction
to any entity-agency or court-interpreting the ADA: "nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of
the Rehabilitation Act ... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to
such title."199
Although the Rehabilitation Act regulations do not address mitigating
measures, consistent interpretive "standards" have been applied to that Act by
federal courts. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Act's definition
of "handicapped individual" broadly and, in doing so, deferred to agency
194. ld.
195. Id. at 515 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
196. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
197. Id. at 279, n.3.
198. See text accompanying note 44, supra.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
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regulations interpreting the Act, including the regulations' appendices, and cited
legislative history of the Act. In Arline the Court held that "a person suffering from
the contagious disease of tuberculosis can be a handicapped person within the
meaning of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."" t' Again recall that § 504's definition
of "handicapped individual" (now "individual with a disability")2"' is the same as
the ADA's definition of "individual with a disability. '"20 The Court found that
agency regulations defining § 504 "are of significant assistance" and "provide 'an
important source of guidance on the meaning of § 504.""203 The Court endorsed the
breadth of the HHS's regulatory definitions, citing the its comments from
regulations' appendix.2' It further cited committee reports explaining the need for
broadening the definition of "handicapped individual" in the 1974 amendments to
the Act.205
Citing the regulations' definitions, the Court found Arline's tuberculosis, which
required her to be hospitalized in the past, made her a "handicapped individual."2' 6
It interpreted the term "substantially limited" generously: "This impairment was
serious enough to require hospitalization, a fact more than sufficient to establish
that one or more of her major life activities were substantially limited by her
impairment. '"2' 7 The fact that Arline's impairment was a contagious disease, the
Court reasoned, did not preclude her from establishing she was a handicapped
individual. Significantly, the Court emphasized the difference between a plaintiffs
prima facie showing that she is a "handicapped individual" and her ultimate
showing that she is "an otherwise qualified handicapped individual" and thus
entitled to the Act's protection:
[T]he definition of "handicapped individual" is broad, but only those individuals
who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are eligible for relief. The
fact that some persons who have contagious diseases may pose a serious health
threat to others under certain circumstances does not justify excluding from the
coverage of the Act all persons with actual or perceived contagious diseases.
Such exclusion would mean that those accused of being contagious would never
have the opportunity to have their condition evaluated in light of medical
evidence and a determination made as to whether they were "otherwise
qualified."2 8
200. Arline, 480 U.S. at 289 (1987).
201. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)03) (1994).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
203. Arline, 480 U.S. at 279 (1987) (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 304, n.24 (1985)).
204. Although many of the comments on the regulations when first
proposed suggested that the definition was unreasonably broad, the Department found that a broad
definition, one not limited to so-called "traditional handicaps," is inherent in the statutory definition.
Id. at 280, n.5.
205. Id. passim.
206. The Court found Arline had a record of impairment under the handicap definition. Id. at 282.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 285 (emphasis in original).
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It is also significant that the Court did not apply an individualized analysis to
the question of whether a person who has a contagious impairment that substantially
limits a major life activity is a handicapped individual. Rather, it held that all such
impairments would entitle plaintiffs to meet their prima facie showing. Acccording
to Arline, an individualized analysis applies to the ultimate question of whether the
person is an otherwise qualified handicapped individual:
The remaining question is whether Arline is otherwise qualified for the job of
elementary schoolteacher. To answer this question in most cases, the district
court will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and make appropriate
findings of fact. Such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of
protecting handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice,
stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such
legitimate concerns of grantees....209
With respect to handicapped individuals whose impairments are contagious, the
Court explained that "[a] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an
infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his
or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk."2"'
Like Arline, the ADA places the question of whether the individual poses a
"direct threat" not in the prima facie analysis of whether a person is an "individual
with a disability," but rather in the ultimate analysis of whether the person is a
"qualified individual with a disability." Arline's holding on "significant risk" was
drafted into the ADA in the "Defenses" section of Title I, which states, "The term
"qualification standards" may include a requirement that an individual shall not
pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." '211
Arline's analysis of a contagious impairment should be used to analyze a
mitigated impairment. Just as the contagiousness of someone's impairment is
assessed with regard to the question of whether that individual with a disability is
"otherwise qualified," the effect of mitigation on a person's impairment should be
assessed with regard to the question of whether that individual with a disability is
"qualified."2 2 Such an analysis conforms to the Court's holding in Arline that
209. Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 288, n.16. After Arline, Congress amended the Rehabilitation Act's definition of "individual with a
disability" to exclude "an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason
of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of thejob." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D)
(1999).
211. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994). Title I defines "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation." Id. § 12111(3). The Supreme Court recognizes
this as an affirmative defense, for which the employer bears the burden of proof. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 653 (1998).
212. See Lanctot, supra note 3 at 338 (emphasis added):
The appropriate analysis would be to consider the individualized conditions of plaintiffs when
determining whether they are "qualified" underthe ADA-that is, whether they can perform the essential
functions of thejob with or withoutreasonable accommodation. Under this methodology, a person with
diabetes who requires insulin would have a disability under the ADA because diabetes is a physical
impairment that substantially limits amajorlife activity. Whether the person was "qualified" to perform
2000]
33
Limas: Of One-Legged Marathoners and Legally Blind Pilots: Disabling the
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1999
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:505
"disability" is broadly defined so as to allow those who have been denied
employment opportunities a chance to prove they were qualified for the jobs they
sought. Sutton's construction of "disability" achieves the opposite result: It
deprives those who have been denied employment opportunities, as were the
Suttons, Murphy and Kirkingburg, of the chance to prove they were qualified for
the jobs they sought. It places such plaintiffs in the limbo of being not impaired
enough to be considered for a job that has been denied them because they are
impaired. Considering mitigation with respect to whether the individual is
"qualified," either with regard to the individual's burden of proof on whether she
can perform the essential functions of thejob with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, or to the employer's burden of proving reasonableness of its qualification
requirements, 13 would effect congressional purpose and allay any fear that the
ADA requires an employer to hire someone who could not safely or effectively
perform the job.214
The above standards used to interpret the Rehabilitation Act bind courts
interpreting the ADA, through Congress' express direction that "nothing in this Act
shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title
V of the Rehabilitation Act... or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant
to such title." '215 Thus, courts must construe the ADA's definition of "individual
with a disability" broadly, seek guidance from agency interpretations of the ADA
and give effect to congressional intent, as discerned from the ADA's legislative
history. Courts should also look tojudicial interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act,
which have generally not considered mitigating measures in determining whether
one is a handicapped individual.2 6
a particular job would require consideration ofanumber of factors, including whether the diabetes was
adequately mitigated by the insulin.
213. For example, United may be able to show that its requirement for commercial pilots of a specific measure
of unassisted visual acuity is proper under the ADA and therefore that the Suttons would not be qualified for that
job. To successfully defend such a blanket requirement under the ADA, all United need do is show that its
requirement is "job-related and consistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (1994).
214. See Sutton, 527 U.S. 471, 503 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted):
If a narrow reading of the term "disability" were necessary in order to avoid the danger that the Act
might otherwise force United to hire pilots who might endanger the lives of their passengers, it would
make good sense to use the "43,000,000 Americans" finding to confine its coverage. There is, however,
no such danger in this case. If a person is "disabled" within the meaning of the Act, she still cannot
prevail on a claim of discrimination unless she can prove that the employer took action "because of'
that impairment, and that she can, "with or without reasonable accommodation, ... perform the essential
functions" of the job of a commercial airline pilot. Even then, an employer may avoid liability if it
shows that the criteria of having uncorrected visual acuity of at least 20/100 is "job-related and
consistent with business necessity" or if such vision (even if correctable to 20/20) would pose a health
or safety hazard.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).
216. Cases arising under the Rehabilitation Act that involve impairments controlled by medication or other
mitigating measures are summarized in Colker, supra note 46 at 154 and n.295-296:
The mitigating measures rule was not promulgated under section 504.... Although the courts did not
explicitly consider the rule under section 504, their holdings are consistent with its application. In the
ten cases brought under section 504 by individuals with conditions often controllable with medication
such as epilepsy or diabetes, the courts assumed that these individuals were "disabled" without
discussion of the significance of their medication's ameliorative effects. Thus, the section 504 case law
supports a mitigating measures rule although no case directly addressed the appropriateness of such a
34
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With respect to how mitigating measures factor into the analysis, deference
to agency interpretation is required by Chevron because, as demonstrated above, the
Court's characterization of the ADA's language as unambiguous on the question of
mitigating measures is simply incorrect. As a matter of fact, other language in the
ADA points strongly to the conclusion that Congress did indeed intend that
mitigating measures not be taken into account in determining disability.
E. Overlooked Statutory Language
a. Title I: Definitions of "Qualified Individual with a Disability" with
Regard to Illegal Drug Use and Use of Medication Taken Under
Medical Supervision
The ADA actually addresses corrective measures in Title I, in the context of
how employers are to treat illegal drug use and supervised use of medication;
however, no court has considered this language. Although the term "disability"
applies to all titles of the ADA, the issue of how corrective measures are to be
treated is most relevant to Title I; indeed, Sutton, Albertsons and Murphy arose in
the employment setting. Title Is language regarding illegal drug use and supervised
medication is therefore significant because it illustrates that consideration of
corrective measures applies not to whether one is disabled but rather one is
qualified for a job.
Recall that "a qualified individual with a disability" under Title I is defined as:
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation,
can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual
holds or desires." '217 The definitions of "disability" from the general Definitions
section of the ADA are embedded within Title I's definition of one who is protected
from workplace discrimination. Thus, as stated previously, a determination of
whether a person is entitled to the protections of Title I mandates a two-part inquiry:
first, whether the person is an "individual with a 'disability' and, second, whether
the person is a "qualified individual with a disability." '218
rule. [footnote:] See, e.g., Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1985) (epilepsy); Scanlon v.
Atascadero State Hosp., 688 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Bentivegna v. United States Dep't
of Labor, 694 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1982) (diabetes); Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 662 F.2d 120 (2d
Cir. 1981) (epilepsy); Davis v. Meese, 692 F. Supp 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (diabetes); Salmon Pineiro v.
Lehman, 653 F. Supp. 483 (D.P.R. 1987) (epilepsy); Martin v. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. for
Children, 599 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (diabetes); Chaplin v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y.,
579 F. Supp. 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (epilepsy); Cain v. Archdiocese of Kansas City, 508 F. Supp. 1021
(D. Kan. 1981) (epilepsy); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(epilepsy). But see Mackie v. Runyon, 804 F. Supp. 1510 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (finding individual with
mental illness not substantially limited in one orimore majorlife activities because medication stabilized
her condition).
217. Id. § 12111(8).
218. Id. § 12112(a).
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Additional language in Title I links illegal drug use to the definition of
"qualified individual with a disability" and therefore to the embedded definition of
"disability." This linkage and the structure of the resulting statutory provision
indicate Congress' direction that corrective measures are not to be taken into
account in determining disability. Section § 12114 of Title I states:
(a) ... For purposes of this subchapter, the term "qualified individual with a
disability" shall not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging
in the illegal use of drugs, when the covered entity acts on the basis of such use.
(b) ... Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to exclude as
a qualified individual with a disability an individual who--
(1) has successfully completed a supervised drug rehabilitation program
and is no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, or who has otherwise been
rehabilitated successfully and is no longer engaging in such use;
(2) is participating in a supervised rehabilitation program and is no
longer engaging in such use;
(3) is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, but is not engaging
in such use ....219
This section of Title Itracks the ADA's three-pronged definition of "disability"
and substitutes the term "illegal use of drugs" in the former for the term "disability"
in the latter. This language substitution indicates that Congress intended to treat
illegal drug use as a disability, albeit with theffurther requirement that one who has
used illegal drugs must no longer be using those drugs. The structure of this
statutory language is quite logical, given initial interpretations of the term
"handicap" under the Rehabilitation Act to include use of illegal drugs.220 Even
when Congress attempted to resolve the ambiguity in the definition of "handicap"
that fostered these initial interpretations, it came up with a limited exclusion of drug
and alcohol use under the 1978 amendments to that Act.221 In the ADA, Congress
wanted to make certain that current illegal drug users would not be covered.222
One may be a qualified individual with a disability if he meets one of the
conditions in subsection (b) of § 12114. Subsection (a) parallels the "actually
219. Id. § 12114.
220. See Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 48 at 452, n.197 (citations omitted):
Previously, the issue of inclusion of drug addiction in the protection of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act had been a controversial one. The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1978 to specify that for
purposes of employment discrimination requirements, the term "handicapped individual" does not
include an individual whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents job performance or constitutes a
direct threat to the property or safety of others. Section 512 of the ADA ... amends the Rehabilitation
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disabled prong" of the general disability definition,"' except that it is exclusionary;
a person is not "a qualified individual with a disability" if that person is actually
using illegal drugs. Subpart (b)(1) parallels the "no longer disabled prong" of the
general disability definition, 24 in that someone with a history of illegal drug use who
is no longer using is treated as a person who has a history of a disability. Similarly,
subpart (b)(3) covering someone who is regarded as using illegal drugs parallels the
"regarded as disabled prong" of the general disability definition.2' The structure of
subsections (a) and (b) clearly indicates that the term "use of illegal drugs" in §
12114 of Title I replaces the word "disability" in § 12102(2) in the general
definitions section of the ADA.
Subpart (b)(2) of § 12114 pertains to corrective measures. It explicitly
mandates that a person who is, for example, taking methadone in a treatment
program for heroin addiction may be entitled to the protections of the ADA as "a
qualified individual with a disability." Just as Title I's definition of "qualified
individual with a disability" in § 12111(8) incorporates the general ADA definition
of "disability" from § 12102(2), the term "qualified individual with a disability" in
§ 12114 incorporates the term "illegal use of drugs." Again, the structure of the
statutory language makes it clear that one who no longer uses illegal drugs and
participates in a supervised rehabilitation program would fit within the general
statutory definition as an "individual with a disability" because of the past illegal
drug use and within Title Is definition of "qualified individual with a disability" by
virtue of being in rehabilitation, the corrective measure taken because ofpast illegal
drug use.
Therefore, a person who is taking methadone in a treatment program for heroin
addiction but whose addiction is "controlled" by methadone, may be entitled to the
protections of Title I as "a qualified individual with a disability." However, if a
former illegal drug user is in rehabilitation, the use of an ameliorative or corrective
measure alone--e.g., methadone--does not by definition affect the person's status as
"an individual with a disability" because the disability is the past drug use. In other
words, the fact that the treatment program controls the impairment--drug addiction--
is irrelevant to the determination of whether the individual is disabled. That fact is,
however, relevant to whether the individual is qualified. As long as the individual
is in some kind of treatment program, that person may be a "qualified individual with
a disability" if he or she can perform the essential functions of the job with or
without reasonable accommodation. The extent to which one's disability of past
illegal drug use is corrected by rehabilitation pertains to the issue of whether he can
perform the essential functions of the job.
This point was illustrated during Senate debates over an amendment to the
Rehabilitation Act to add language that made that Act consistent with the ADA with
respect to treatment of illegal drug users.226 Senator Kennedy explained:
223. See text accompanying note 52, supra.
224. See Burgdorf, supra note 48, at 482.
225. See id.
226. The amendment appears in the Rehabilitation Act at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(C) (1994).
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In addition, the act's protections extend to rehabilitated individuals who no longer
use illegal drugs, but who continue to participate in treatment programs--such as
a methadone maintenance treatment program-or continue to receive after-care
counseling or participate in self-help programs. This reflects our recognition that
these activities can be crucial to many individuals' ability to successfully sustain
their recovery. 7
Additional language in Title I adopts the same structure. It defines "illegal use
of drugs" as excluding "the use of a drug taken under supervision by a licensed
health care professional" and further defines "drug" as a controlled substance:
The term "illegal use of drugs" means the use of drugs, the possession or
distribution of which is unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C.
812) [sic]. Such term does not include the use of a drug taken under supervision
by a licensed health care professional, or other uses authorized by the Controlled
Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 801 et seq.] or other provisions of Federal law.
The term "drug" means a controlled substance, as defined in schedules I through
V of section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act [21 U.S.C.A. § 812].228
Congress of course assumed that some individuals with disabilities would be
taking medications, including "drugs" as defined above, under the care of health
professionals; this point was again explained by Senator Kennedy in a continuation
of the above-quoted comments:
In this connection, it is important to note that the definition of "illegal drugs" does
notinclude controlled substances that are taken pursuant to a medical prescription.
This includes all kinds of drugs taken under medical supervision, including
experimental drugs. One example of such a controlled substance is methadone
taken as part of a course of methadone maintenance treatment.229
This statutory exclusion, by appearing in Title I's definition of "illegal use of
drugs," likewise relates to the ADA's general definition of "disability." Congress
contemplated that many individuals with disabilities would be taking medications
and that those individuals' disability status should not be affected by the taking of
prescribed medications, even if the medication is a controlled substance that would
be illegal to use without supervision of a health care professional. Thus the effect of
the medication bears not on the question of whether the person is "an individual with
a disability," but rather whether the person is "a qualified individual with a
disability."
227. 135 Cong. Record 19,873 (1989).
228. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(6), 12210(d) (1994).
229. 135 Fed. Reg. at 10,774-775.
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b. Title V: Exclusion of Certain Conditions from the Definition of
"Disability"
Additional language in Title V excluding the "parade of horribles" that some
legislators crusaded to keep out of the ADA's definition of "disability"23 refers to
certain "impairments" or "conditions" and explicitly excludes them from the ADA's
general definition of "disability" in § 12102(2). Section § 12208 of Title V states:
For the purposes of this Act, the term "disabled" or "disability" shall not apply to
an individual solely because that individual is a transvestite." 1
Transvestites get double mention, along with other conditions, in § 12211:
(a) Homosexuality and bisexuality
For purposes of the definition of "disability" in section 12102(2) of this
title, homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments and as such are not
disabilities under this chapter.
(b) Certain conditions
Under this chapter, the term "disability" shall not include-
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior
disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance abuse disorders resulting from current illegal use
of drugs. 2
Congress' blanket exclusion of these conditions from the ADA's definition of
"disability" further illustrates its intent that corrective measures are not be taken into
account in determining disability. Someone who has been diagnosed at any time
with any of these conditions is excluded from the three-part definition of "individual
with a disability" regardless of whether that person correctly has the condition, is
receiving treatment to correct the condition or the condition has been corrected (i.e.
has a history of having the condition). 3 Like illegal drug use, these conditions are
treated by the statute as disabilities, albeit ones specifically excluded from that
statutory category.
230. See, e.g., Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 3 at 451-52.
231. 42U.S.C. § 12208 (1994).
232. 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (1994).
233. Someone who is discriminated against under the "regarded as disabled prong," which requires that the
individual not actually be disabled-i.e., not actually have one of the conditions listed-would appear from the
language above not even to be protected. For a criticism of these exclusions as being inconsistent with the precepts
of the ADA, see Burgdorf, Analysis and Implications, supra note 3 at 452, n. 197.
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The foregoing analysis of the plain language of the ADA, which derives from
the language and structure of the statute, provides a clearer window into the meaning
of "disability" under the ADA than the Court's "plain language" analysis of the
ADA's general disability definition and prefatory finding of the estimated number of
"disabled" persons. Unlike the Court's analysis, it actually does take into account the
Act as a whole. The interpretation derived from the above analysis also fits
consistently and cohesively with every other source available--regulations, guidance,
legislative history--that can be used to explain the meaning of "disability" in the
ADA. Sutton's interpretation does not.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUTTON
Whether the Court was motivated by skepticism about the efficacy of the ADA,
contempt for "ambiguous government regulation interfering with employer
prerogative," distrust of the legislative record or simply "judicial myopia, "234 its
decisions will bankrupt the ADA and those whom it was meant to protect, especially
in the context of employment. The Court's refusal to recognize that some impair-
ments are inherently substantially limiting and its resultant directive to assess the
limitations of individuals' impairments on a case-by-case basis will, as one
commentator predicted three years ago, "at best ... create massive confusion for
employers and lower courts," as well as plaintiffs, and "[a]t worst, exclu[de] people
with serious medical conditions from ADA protections" giving employers "free rein
to discriminate against such employees.""3 5 Under the Court's approach, each
plaintiff must be "considered in a vacuum, without reliance on other reported cases
addressing the same disease," but on "the particular set of symptoms he or she
possesses." '236
The Court acknowledged that "'accumulated myths and fears about disability
and disease' can motivate employers' decisions.237 Such "myths and fears" can not
only cause an employer to see a disability where there is none, 31 but can cause the
employer to misperceive the effects of an actual disability. In reacting out of "myths
and fears," the employer does not first assess the degree to which the person is
234. See Tepker, supra note 164 at 197.The Court has been accused of "judicial activism in service ofjudicial
skepticism" about the ADA:
Whether one shares the Justices' skepticism about the Act or believes that the law has been unfairly
insensitive to the plight of the disabled, it is fair to sense that the trio of cases have roots in a legal trick
unknown and unknowable when the Act was passed.
Id. at 197, 196.
235. Lanctot, supra note 3 at 333.
236. Id. at 332. She notes the irony that "courts show no comparable reluctance to uphold employer rules that
discriminate on the basis of having a particular disease, regardless of the particularized medical condition of
individuals adversely affected by the rule." Id. at 337, n.46.
237. Sutton, 527 U.S. 471,489 (1999) (quoting School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284
(1987)).
238. As discussed previously, this is the situation the "regarded as disabled" prong of the disability definition
would address. See note 18, supra.
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substantially limitedV39 But in the face of such a reaction, the Court requires a
person to show how the symptoms of his impairment substantially limit him before
he can receive the ADA's protection.
The Court's rule will affect not only those who mitigate their disabilities but
those who do not. In order to prevent the situation in which an individual may be
entitled to accommodation by an employer under the ADA if he or she simply stops
taking medication or using ameliorative measures, Sutton's rule would require that
courts deny ADA coverage to impaired individuals who should have mitigated their
impairments. To make such a determination, courts will have to investigate why the
individual did not use mitigating measures and what measures the individual should
have used.2 '
This was done in Tangires v. The Johns Hopkins Hospital.24 ' Plaintiff suffered
from asthma and had been prescribed a steroid inhalant, but she refused to use it
because she also suffered from a pituitary tumor and feared the steroid's effect on the
tumor.242 Plaintiff did use a non-steroid inhalant, but her doctor testified that her
asthma symptoms could be brought under control if she used the steroid inhalant.243
The Court determined that plaintiffs fear was unfounded because her treating doctors
knew of both conditions and what had been prescribed. The court held that because
"the plaintiffs asthma was correctable by medication and ... she voluntarily refused
the recommended medication, her asthma did not substantially limit her in any major
life activity. ' "' (The court would not assess the substantially limiting effect of the
plaintiffs impairment with regard to the nonsteroid inhalant 45) Although the court
cited Sutton's rule elsewhere in the case, it did not cite Sutton for this holding,
Rather it cited a case holding that a plaintiff who did not "avail herself' of proper
treatment was not a "'qualified individual' under the ADA.246 Like the Supreme
Court in Sutton, the district court seemed to confuse the determination of whether
one is an individual with a disability with the issue of whether one is a qualified
individual with a disability. As discussed above, consideration of the effect of
mitigating measures on the individual is appropriate in determining whether the
individual is qualified to do the job in question, but not whether the individual is
disabled.
239. By definition, prejudice against people with certain disabilities does not rest on a fact-specific inquiry.
Prejudice is not tailored to a person's particular set of symptoms. Prejudice is not determined by the degree to
which a medical condition substantially limits a major life activity. Prejudice stems from over generalizations,
myths and stereotypes, unwarranted assumptions and fear. In short, prejudice by its very nature is not based on
ad hoc reactions to particular individuals. Prejudice is inherently per se.
Lanctot, supra note 3 at 337 (footnotes omitted).
240. See Isaac S. Greaney, Note, The Practical Impossibility of Considering the Effect of Mitigating Measures
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 1267, 1292-1293 (1999).
241. 79 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. Md. 2000).
242. Id. at 595.
243. Id. at 596.
244. Id.
245. Id. See note 149, supra, which discusses the Court's presentation of the question in Murphy as "whether
the determination of petitioner's disability is made with reference to the mitigating measures he employs."
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This result is troubling, for courts will now be making ad hoc factual
determinations of the appropriate treatment for a plaintiff's impairment in the prima
facie stage of a disability case. This adds a higher hurdle to the plaintiff's threshold
burden of showing membership in the ADA's protected class. The primary factual
question will become not whether the plaintiff is disabled by the impairment, but
whether the plaintiff properly mitigated the impairment or whether plaintiff should
have mitigated the impairment. Such a result runs far astray of the ADA's language,
history and policy.
The Court has construed the ADA in a manner that blatantly disregards express
statutory direction and contradicts every indication of Congress' intent. The Sutton
trilogy validates federal courts' reluctance to apply the Act to claims of disability
discrimination under Title I.247 As a result, ten years after the passage of the ADA,
disabled workers remain "severely underrepresented" in the workplace.248
247. Employers prevailed in 91.6 percent of cases between 1992 and 1997, 94.4 percent in 1998, and 95.7
percent in 1999, despite a constant 85 percent success rate at the EEOC from 1992 through 1999. 121 DAILY
LABOR REPORT (BNA) A-7 (June 22,2000).
248. Lois C. Rose, Observers Assess 10 Years of ADA Activity; Predict Supreme Court's Next Move on Title
II, 133 DAILY LABOR REPORT (BNA) B-1 (July 11, 2000).
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